

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	22 Apr 80
TO:		A/NIO/W	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
5G00	Hqs.		
<p><i>file in SW5 file, pls.</i></p>			
<p>I'd like to discuss this with you tomorrow.</p> <p><i>Note: Discussed w/ RL on 23 Apr. He likes the paper. I told him I had grave doubts re. [] judgment. He agreed to review future publications dist'd. prior to printing.</i></p>			
FROM: Richard Lehman, C/NIC			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	
7E62	Hqs.		

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**Strategic Warning Staff**

Washington, D.C. 20301

S-0036/SWS

18 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING

SUBJECT: Warning from the Strategic Warning Staff

1. For several successive governments in Washington the cry has been that intelligence has been watered-down, too bland to understand, represents the least common denominator, or that it is not timely. True enough these criticisms have often come from policy makers who did not find adequate support in intelligence for their current preferred political courses of action. Nonetheless, the criticism has often been on the mark. For example, in 1968 after many in the intelligence community responsible for monitoring Soviet activities noticed and reported that Soviet forces were building up to invasion strength opposite Czechoslovakia, that judgement proved controversial and was basically not found outside the intelligence community. Likewise in this last year when the Soviets began their build up and change in posture opposite Afghanistan, judgements reflecting same were again controversial and were hard to find outside the intelligence community. In both of these cases had there been a publication such as the Strategic Warning Special Report, policy makers and intelligence analysts would have had the opportunity to consider the risk ahead and formulate alternative courses of action should the predicted calamity come to pass. []

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2. Inherent in the previous complaints about intelligence by the Administrations over the past decade or so has been the implied assumption that policy makers deserve the right to make contingency plans. I believe the SWS has the responsibility to do more than alert other analysts, the Staff should be providing information to a broader audience. Reports by the Strategic Warning Staff of controversial nature should receive distribution among all policy making organizations in Washington as did the Monthly Report formerly published by the Staff. []

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3. Our Special Report of 11 April 1980 provided policy makers with an alternative view of Soviet actions, possibly in preparation to invade Northwestern Iran. It was presented as an alternative view and it did provide the basis for considering alternative courses of action by the Administration. It seems to have been well received downtown for that reason. []

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4. Distribution for the Special Report of 11 April was made according to a list used for the Strategic Warning Monthly Report, a serial of the Staff for several years running. Although this serial is no longer produced, it dealt with intelligence of a warning nature and was not coordinated within the community. The distribution list for the recent special report had

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some deletions from the Monthly list, but had no additional organizations. The amended list was approved by the DDO for ORCON release. In keeping with the Director's policy of providing information to those who need it in Washington, the distribution included--as did that for the monthly--the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the NSC Staff as well as State INR and DIA. We might consider sending future reports to the Secretary of State in addition to State INR to speed distribution.

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Director